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I. INTRODUCTION

Before any Contracting State denounced the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes Convention (ICSID Convention),' very
few academics and commentators bothered interpreting the meaning of its
provisions dealing with potential denunciations or, more importantly, the
effectiveness of withdrawing from the ICSID Convention. Yet, with the
denunciations of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, several doubts have
arisen and numerous and conflicting interpretations by scholars and
practitioners have been put forward. All of them are problematic or
unnecessarily complicated.
This article is aimed at addressing, in the simplest way, the doubts as
to the meaning of Articles 71 and 72 of the ICSID Convention in relation to
the effectiveness of a denunciation. Furthermore, with a logical and
objective interpretation of those provisions, and based on the principle of
good faith, I conclude that under Articles 71 and 72, a foreign investor is
able to accept an offer of ICSID arbitration, in a bilateral investment treaty
*
The author is admitted to practice law in Venezuela and is a PhD Candidate in
International Law at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva,
Switzerland. The author currently serves as a Visiting Researcher at Florida International University
College of Law as holder of a Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) Doc.Mobility Fellowship,
which supported this article. This article builds upon the author's prior comments on the denunciation
of the ICSID Convention in his book ARBITRAJE DE INVERSIONES EN VENEZUELA (Caracas, 2012). The

author wishes to express his deepest gratitude to Professor Andrea K. Bjorklund for her useful
comments to a draft of this article. All mistakes are the author's alone.
1.
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, Oct. 14, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].

ILSA JournalofInternational& ComparativeLaw

424

[Vol. 20:3

(BIT) or investment law, within the six-month period set forth in Article 71.
Although the latest denunciation occurred already more than two years ago,
it appears now is the time when ICSID will be dealing with these
provisions.
For the first time in more than forty years since it was opened for
signature in 1965, a Contracting State denounced the ICSID Convention on
May 2, 2007 when the World Bank, acting as a depositary, received
Bolivia's notice of denunciation.2 As the World Bank stated on its website,
and in accordance with Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, the
denunciation took effect on November 3, 2007, six months after Bolivia
submitted its notice of denunciation. Until Bolivia's denunciation, no
State had withdrawn from the ICSID system, but Ecuador followed suit two
years later in 2009.4 More recently, and several years after the first time the
Venezuelan Government gave public signals of its intent to denounce the
ICSID Convention, 5 on January 24, 2012, the World Bank received a third
Contracting State's notice of denunciation from the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela.
Following these denunciations, novel and complex legal issues of
systemic importance for the international investment regime arose. A
2.
Bolivia Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, ICSID (May 16, 2007),
http1/icsid.worldbank.orgfICSID/FrontServletrequestType=CasesRH&actionValOpenPage&PageType-An
nouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcement3 (last visited Mar. 21, 2014).

Id.

3.

4.
See EcuadorSubmits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, ICSID (July 9, 2009),
https//icsid.worldbank.orgICSID/FrontServlet?requestType-CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=A
nnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcement2O (last visited Mar. 21, 2014)
(In fact, on July 6, 2009, the World Bank received the notice of denunciation of the ICSID Convention from
the Republic of Ecuador-the denunciation took effect on January 7, 2010).
5.
On April 28, 2007, during the Fifth Summit of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas
(ALBA), which took place in Barquisimeto, Venezuela, the Bolivian President proposed the member
states (Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, and Nicaragua) to withdraw from ICSID. The proposal was supported
by all ALBA Members, including Cuba and Venezuela-even though Cuba was not, and is still not, an
ICSID Contracting State. Furthermore, on February 12, 2008, the National Assembly of the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela issued an Accord whereby it encouraged the President of the Republic to
withdraw from ICSID. The Accord was published in the Official Gazette of the Bolivian Republic of
Venezuela.

GACETA OFICIAL DE LA REPULICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, No. 38.869, Feb. 13,

2008.
Venezuela Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, ICSID (Jan. 26,
6.
2012),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/lCSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&
PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcements&pageName=Announcementl00
(last
visited Mar. 21, 2014) (In fact, on January 24, 2012, the World Bank received the notice of denunciation of
the ICSID Convention from Venezuela-the denunciation took effect on July 25, 2012).
7.
CONFERENCE

Denunciation of The ICSID Convention and BITs: Impact On Investor-State Claims, U.N.
ON TRADE AND DEv.
HA ISSUES NOTE No. 2, at 1 U.N. Doc.
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great debate has focused around the moment at which a denouncing State
can no longer be subject to arbitration under the aegis of the ICSID
Convention. Such debate appears particularly relevant when it comes to
ICSID arbitration provisions contained in BITs and investment laws. The
contradiction that seemingly exists between Articles 71 and 72 of the
ICSID Convention has given rise to opposing views about the effectiveness
in time of such denunciations.
This article explains why, under a good faith interpretation of Articles
71 and 72 of the ICSID Convention, a foreign investor is able to submit a
dispute to the ICSID even if such investor has not accepted the relevant socalled offer of ICSID arbitration before the depositary received the
respective notice of denunciation. In fact, the investor could accept the
offer of arbitration within the six-month period set forth in Article 71.
Articles 71 and 72 of the ICSID Convention provide as follows:
Article 71: Any Contracting State may denounce this
Convention by written notice to the depositary of this
Convention. The denunciation shall take effect six months after
receipt of such notice.8
Article 72: Notice by a Contracting State pursuant to Articles
70 or 71 shall not affect the rights or obligations under this
Convention of that State or of any of its constituent subdivisions
or agencies or of any national of that State arising out of consent
to the jurisdiction of the Centre given by one of them before such
notice was received by the depositary.9
II. THREE APPROACHES
Generally speaking, there are three positions as to the date of
effectiveness of the denunciation of the ICSID Convention.o First, there
are the most conservative who argue that the denunciation is effective
immediately." Others are of the opinion that, even after the denunciation,
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IIA/2010/2
(Dec.
2010),
webdiaeia20l06_en.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2014).
8.

ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 71.

9.

Id. art. 72.

available

at

http://unctad.org/en/Docs/

10.
See Escobar, supra note 2, at 18; see also Christian Tietje, Karsten Nowrot & Clemens
Wackemagel, Once and Forever? The Legal Effects of a Denunciationof ICSID, 6 TRANSNAT'L DisP.
MGMT., at 8 (Mar. 2009).
11.

This first position is basically the one offered by Professor Christoph Schreuer in the first

edition of his book. See CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 1286

(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001); see generally Roberto Castro de Figueredo, Euro Telecom v. Bolivia:
The Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and ICSID Arbitration Under BITs, 6 TRANSNAT'L DISP.
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there is an additional six-month period during which those offers of ICSID
arbitration existing prior to the denunciation can be invoked or accepted.12
Finally, the less conservative argue that the denouncing State can be validly
submitted to ICSID arbitration even after expiration of the six-month period
following the denunciation, provided there is a jurisdictional provision in a
BIT that allows such a possibility.' 3 There are even those who have
analyzed the issue without taking a clear position.14
III. THE PROBLEM

According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 5
the termination of a treaty, a State party's denunciation or withdrawal from
it, can only take place as a result of the application of the provisions of the
MGMT. (Mar. 2009); see Julien Fouret, Denunciation of the Washington Convention and NonContractualInvestment Arbitration: "ManufacturingConsent" to ICSID Arbitration?,25 J. INT'L ARB.
71, 84 (2008).
12.
See Marco E. Schnabl & Julie Bdard, The Wrong Kind of 'Interesting': The Investment
Climate in Latin America Recalls a Certain Chinese Proverb, NAT'L L. J., July 30, 2007, available at
http://www.arbitralwomen.org/files/publication/1910231238362.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2014); see
also Sebastien Manciaux, Bolivia's Withdrawal from ICSID, 4 TRANSNAT'L DISp. MGMT., at 1 (Sept.
2007).
Cf Fernando Mantilla-Serrano, The Effect of Bolivia's Withdrawalfrom the Washington
13.
Convention: Is BIT-Based ICSID Jurisdiction Foreclosed?, 22 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REPORT 39
(2007); Emmanuel Gaillard, The Denunciationof the ICSID Convention, N.Y. L.J., June 26, 2007; see
Michael D. Nolan & Fr6d6ric G. Sourgens, The InterplayBetween State Consent to ICSID Arbitration
and Denunciationof the ICSID Convention: The (Possible) Venezuela Case Study, TRANSNAT'L DisP.
MGMT., at 14-15 (Sept. 2007); see Oscar M. Garibaldi, On the Denunciation of the ICSID Convention,
Consent to ICSID Jurisdiction,and the Limits of the ContractAnalogy, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 251, 268-69 (Christina

Binder et al., eds., 2009); see Tietje, supra note 10, at 9; see generally Gauthier Vannieuwenhuyse,
Bringinga Dispute Concerning ICSID Cases and the ICSID Convention Before the InternationalCourt
ofJustice, 8 L. & PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBS. 115, 115-41 (2009).
14.
Keyvan Rastegar employs multiple syllogisms and mechanisms typical of the field of
Philosophy of Law and presents the problematic in relation to the language of Articles 71 and 72,
although without assuming a clear position regarding which is the moment in which the denunciation of
See Keyvan Rastegar, Denouncing ICSID, in
the ICSID Convention becomes effective.
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY:

ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH

SCHREUER 278, 300-01 (Christina Binder et al., eds., 2009). Ramiro Guevara points to a different
theory, according to which, "consent to ICSID jurisdiction [is] granted by both States at the time they
[ratify] the ICSID Convention and [ratify] each individual BIT." Ramiro Guevara, An Update of
Bolivia's Recent Actions, 5 TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT., at 3 (Apr. 2008). Accordingly, "j]urisdiction is
born because the States themselves grant it. Investors simply avail themselves of it procedurally." Id. at
3. Unfortunately this author does not provide further details of this theory, which, in any event, apart
from being very interesting, I do not find very convincing.
15.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M.
679 [hereinafter VCLT].
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treaty in question, or the provisions within the VCLT itself.16 Pursuant to
the VCLT, if a treaty contains a provision concerning its termination,
denunciation, or withdrawal, such provision(s) shall be observed.17 Article
71 of the ICSID Convention indicates the steps that a Contracting State has
to observe in order to denounce the convention.18 According to Article 71,
a Contracting State can denounce the ICSID Convention by means of a
written notice to the depositary.' 9 Then, the depositary shall notify all
signatory States of any denunciation under Article 71 .20 Also in accordance
with Article 71, a denunciation shall take effect six months after receipt of
the notice of denunciation by the depositary. 21 This appears to mean that in
the event a Contracting State denounces the ICSID Convention, it will
continue to be a Contracting State during the six-month period following
the notice date.
So far, there would appear to be no problem in determining the
effective date of the denunciation. However, Article 72 of the ICSID
Convention gives rise to certain interpretation problems in regard to the
timeliness of expressions of consent to the ICSID Convention, particularly
in the case of the so-called offers of arbitration contained in investment
treaties or investment laws and their acceptance by foreign investors.
Hence, Article 72's language is the core of the discussion.22 According to
the language set forth in Article 72, the denunciation of the ICSID
Convention would not affect the rights or obligations arising out of consent
given by the State or the investor before the World Bank receives the notice

16.
See id. art. 42. Because the VCLT applies only to treaties that are concluded after its entry
into force, the VCLT is not directly applicable to the ICSID Convention. In fact, the VCLT entered into
force on January 27, 1980 whereas the ICSID Convention entered into force on October 14, 1966.
Nevertheless, the VCLT is generally regarded as a codification of customary international law.
Therefore, its rules serve as guidance for interpreting Articles 71 and 72 of the ICSID Convention.
17.

Id.

18.

ICSID Convention, supranote 1, art. 71.

19.
Id. art. 71 ("Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention by written notice to the
depositary of this Convention. The denunciation shall take effect six months after receipt of such
notice.") (emphasis added).
20.

Id. art. 75(f).

21.

Id. art. 71.

22.

Id. art. 72. Article 72 reads:
Notice by a Contracting State pursuant to Articles 70 or 71 shall not affect the
rights or obligations under this Convention of that State or of any of its
constituent subdivisions or agencies or of any national of that State arising out of
consent to the jurisdiction of the Centre given by one of them before such notice
was received by the depositary.
Id. (emphasis added).
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23

On reading Article 72 textually, it would therefore
of denunciation.
appear that any expression of consent would have to occur prior to the date
upon which the World Bank-as depository-receives the notice of
That out-of-context reading of Article 72 gives the
denunciation.
impression that it clashes with Article 71 of the ICSID Convention.2 4
While Article 71 provides for a six-month survival period after the
denunciation for it to become effective, Article 72 suggests that, in order to
secure consent, the investor must give his or her consent prior to the very
notice of denunciation. 2 5 Furthermore, Article 72 also suggests that the
investor could not give his or her consent to arbitration provision set forth
in the ICSID Convention within the six-month survival period, i.e., before
the denunciation becomes effective. 26 This contradiction between Articles
71 and 72 of the ICSID Convention is what has given rise to conflicting
positions regarding the exact date upon which the practical effects of the
denunciation occur. As will be seen in Parts V and VI below, there is no
such contradiction.
IV. THE "SCHREUER FACTOR"
In light of the singularity of the first edition of his book, The ICSID
Convention: A Commentary, and his reputation as an authority in the field,
the observations of Professor Christoph Schreuer regarding Article 72 of
the ICSID Convention are perhaps what unleashed most controversy
regarding the scope of the arbitration provision. In particular, Schreuer
rejected the possibility of invoking ICSID arbitration provisions, i.e.,
accepting offers of arbitration, whether contained in BITs or investment
laws, during the six-month period referred to in Article 71 of the
Convention, and much less after such period had expired.27 The most basic
reason for Schreuer to adopt that view stems from the fact that he deems the
expressions of consent by States to ICSID arbitration provision, contained
in BITs or investment laws, as mere offers of consent. 28 For Professor
Schreuer, consent becomes irrevocable only when an investor accepts the
offer. 29 As will be seen below, that is not the unanimous view among
commentators and scholars.

23.

ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 72.

24.

See id.

25.

Id.

26.

Id.

27.

Id.

28.

See SCHREUER, supranote 11, at 218.

29.

See SCHREUER, supra note 11, at 253.
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According to Schreuer, Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, which
indicates that the denunciation by a Contracting State shall take effect only
six months after receipt of such notice: "[D]oes not afford an opportunity
to perfect consent during this [six-month] period."3 In that regard:
An investor's attempt to accept a standing offer of consent by the
host State that may exist under legislation or a treaty after receipt
of the notice [under Article 71] would not succeed. In order to be
preserved by Art[icle] 72, consent would have to be perfected
prior to the receipt [by the World Bank] of the notice of .
denunciation. 31
According to Professor Schreuer, pursuant to Article 72 of the ICSID
Convention, consent by investors must be given before the denunciation of
the ICSID Convention takes place; in other words, before the World Bank
receives the respective notice of denunciation, i.e., prior to the six-month
period set forth in Article 71.32 The preparatory work for the ICSID
Convention would seem to support Schreuer's position. Although the
travaux do not give a specific answer to the doubts that have since arose
with regard to the interpretation of Articles 71 and 72, it seems clear that
Mr. Aron Broches' inclination was to consider offers of arbitration as not
having any effect before they are accepted by the investor.33 Mr. Aron
Broches was the General Counsel of the World Bank and also President of
the Legal Committee on the Settlement of Investment Disputes at the time
when the ICSID Convention was prepared, and he is regarded as the drafter
of this international treaty.
On February 25, 1965, the Executive Directors of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) met as a
Committee of the Whole on the Settlement of Investment Disputes and
evaluated what eventually became the ICSID Convention. At this meeting,
Mr. Joaquin Gutidrrez Cano, Executive Director of the World Bank
appointed by Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, made an important remark.
The Spanish diplomat and politician Guti6rrez Cano put forward the case in
which there was no agreement between the State and the foreign investor,
30.

SCHREUER, supranote 11, at 1280-81.

31.

Id. (emphasis added).

This position is shared by the authors Roberto Castro de Figueredo and Julien Fouret, who,
32.
following the Bolivian denunciation of the ICSID Convention, published articles on the issue. They
both consider that the consent given by a State through a BIT is but a mere offer of consent and that it
does not guarantee ICSID jurisdiction, unless the investor has accepted such offer. See Castro de
Figueredo, supranote 11, at 9; Fouret, supranote 11, at 78, 82, 85.
33.

See Nolan, supranote 13.
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but only a general declaration on the part of the State in favor of submission
of claims to the ICSID Convention, and a subsequent withdrawal from the
Convention by that State before any claim had been in fact submitted to
ICSID. In this respect, he wondered whether the ICSID Convention would
still compel the State to accept the jurisdiction of ICSID.34
To this remark, Mr. Broches replied that a general statement of the
kind mentioned by Mr. Gutidrrez Cano would not be binding on the State
that had made it until it had been accepted by the investor. If the State
withdraws its unilateral statement by denouncing the Convention before
any investor has accepted it, no investor could later bring a claim before
ICSID. If, however, the unilateral offer of the State has been accepted
before the denunciation of the ICSID Convention, then those disputes
arising between the State and the investor after the date of denunciation will
still be within the jurisdiction of ICSID.
Mr. Broches' comments seem to suggest that in order for an investor
to preserve access to ICSID arbitration, the investor would need to consent
to ICSID arbitration before the World Bank receives the notice of
denunciation; however, that may not necessarily be his position. In fact,
Mr. Broches' might have been referring to the "denunciation" not as a
single event occurring when the World Bank receives the notice of
denunciation, but as a complex event taking place throughout the six-month
term set forth in Article 71 of the ICSID Convention. If one considers that
"denunciation" is a complex and constructive process occurring in several
steps that starts with the notice and finishes upon expiration of the sixmonth term in Article 71, then Mr. Broches' comments no longer reflect a
position so conservative as interpreted by Professor Christoph Schreuer in
the first edition of his book.
Be that as it may, in the 2009 edition of his Commentary, Schreuer
admits that there is an alternative interpretation that may be based on a
literal reading of Article 72 of the ICSID Convention in the light of Article
25(1). He highlights the fact that while Article 25(1) refers to mutual
consent, Article 72 refers to consent given by only one of them. Based on
this, Professor Schreuer acknowledges that it may be argued that the phrase
"given by one of them" indicates that Article 72 covers a unilateral
expression of consent by the host State before its acceptance by the
This would mean that the mere expression of consent by the
investor.

34.

ICSID, HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION:

DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN

AND THE FORMULATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INV. DIsP. BETWEEN STATES
AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES 1010 (1st ed. 2001).

35.

Id.

36.

See id.
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host State remains unaffected by a notice under Article 71 of the ICSID
Convention.37 Schreuer also points out that:
Under this [alternative] interpretation, the investor would retain
the right to accept the host State's offer of consent, as long as the
offer continues to exist, even after a notice under . .. Art[icle] 71.
The expiry of the six-month period in Art[icle] 71 would not
affect this right .

. .

. The investor's right to accept the offer of

consent would remain until the State withdraws the offer. In
order to escape the effect of Art[icle] 72, the State would have to
revoke its consent separately. In the case of an offer of consent
contained in domestic legislation, the legislation would have to
be repealed or amended. In the case of an offer of consent
contained in a treaty, its withdrawal would be considerably more
difficult and would have to conform to the law of treaties.
This alternative interpretation recognized by Professor Schreuer seems to
be in line with the position of Emmanuel Gaillard, Fernando MantillaSerrano, and Oscar Garibaldi, among others.39
V. THIS ARTICLE'S SUBMISSION
It is this article's submission that a good faith interpretation of Articles
71 and 72 of the ICSID Convention allows for the conclusion that a foreign
investor can submit a dispute to ICSID arbitration even if the offer was not
accepted by the investor before the depositary received the notice of the
denunciation. Indeed, the investor would have the possibility to state his or
her consent, thereby accepting the offer of arbitration contained in a BIT or
in a domestic investment law, and thus perfect the arbitration agreement
within the six-month period referred to in Article 71 of the ICSID
Convention. Such a conclusion is based on Article 71 itself, which is clear
in establishing that the denunciation of the ICSID Convention shall take
effect six months after receipt of the notice. 40 Any other interpretation
would strip the second part of Article 71 of the ICSID Convention of any
practical meaning and effet utile.
In fact, Article 72 of the ICSID Convention indicates that the notice by
a Contracting State pursuant to Article 71, i.e., the notice of denunciation of
the ICSID Convention, shall not affect the rights or obligations under the
37.

SCHREUER, supranote 11, at 1280.

38.

Id.

39.
See generally Gaillard,supra note 13; see generally Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 13; see
generally Garibaldi,supra note 13.
40.

ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 71.
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Convention of that denouncing State or of any national of that State.4 1 Such
rights and obligations under the ICSID Convention are those arising out of
the consent to the jurisdiction of the ICSID given by the State that is
denouncing the ICSID Convention or given by any national of that State
vis-a-vis a host State, before the notice of denunciation was received by the
depositary.4 2
Thus, for example, a Contracting State, "Denunciationland," could
enter into a contract that includes an ICSID arbitration clause and some
months later denounce the Convention. If this were to happen, any disputes
arising out of that contract would still be subject to arbitration before
ICSID. By the same token, before Denunciationland denounces the ICSID
Convention, a national of Denunciationland could enter into a contract with
another as a Contracting State in which they establish the ICSID arbitration
as the dispute resolution mechanism. If, after the execution of this
hypothetical contract, Denunciationland were to denounce the ICSID
Convention, those disputes arising out of the contract between the
Denunciationland national and the host State would continue to be subject
to the ICSID arbitration provisions. In other words, the meaning of Article
72 is that the denunciation of the ICSID Convention does not affect those
ICSID arbitration agreements where one of the parties is the denouncing
State or one of its nationals, provided that such arbitration agreements have
been entered into before Denunciationland has sent the notice of
denunciation of the Convention. In this regard:
There is general agreement that, at least if both parties to the
dispute have given their consent to ICSID jurisdiction before the
notice of denunciation is received by the World Bank, the dispute
may be submitted to ICSID at any time thereafter, even after the
notice of denunciation has taken effect under Article 71.4
In that sense, the ICSID Convention "puts no time limit on that party's right
to consent or the denouncing State's obligations derived from its pre-notice
consent.'"
But the key to unravel all controversy in regard to the denunciation of
the ICSID Convention and to understand the interaction between Articles
71 and 72 is to keep in mind that Article 72 does not exclude or prohibit the
possibility that arbitration agreements will be perfected during the survival

41.

ICSID Convention, supranote 1, art. 72.

42.

See generally id.

43.

Garibaldi, supra note 13, at 260.

44.

Id. at 270.
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period set forth by Article 71 of the ICSID Convention.45 It is simple:
Article 72 does not contemplate the case of arbitration agreements that are
entered into during the six-month survival period.46
That case is
contemplated in Article 71. Furthermore, the language of Article 72 does
not mean that the force of the ICSID Convention ceases immediately upon
receipt of the notice of denunciation by the depositary. In other words,
there is no justification to afford some kind of a contrario sensu
interpretation to Article 72 of the ICSID Convention. In that connection,
Article 71 provides that the denunciation shall take effect six months after
receipt of such notice by the depositary. Therefore, during the six-month
period of Article 71, it is also possible to perfect ICSID arbitration
agreements.
History has shown that at the time of the drafting of the ICSID
Convention, offers of arbitration arising out of BITs were by no means the
focus. Indeed, consent to submission to arbitration was typically given
simultaneously by both parties, either by way of an arbitration clause in a
State-contract with regard to future possible disputes, or in the form of a
compromis concerning a dispute that had already arisen.47 It is quite
probable that this is why the discussions of the different committees, both
the Legal Committee and the Committee of the Whole, did not directly
tackle the case of potential acceptance of an arbitration offer in a BIT
during the six-month period set forth in Article 71 of the ICSID
Convention. Yet, importantly, nowhere does the text of the ICSID
Convention, nor its preparatory work, contemplate a prohibition against
accepting offers of arbitration during the aforementioned six-month
period. 48 Therefore, an objective and good faith interpretation of Article 72
in the ICSID Convention should not extract a prohibition where no such
prohibition exists, either in that provision or in the entire text of the ICSID
Convention.
Although it is true that Article 72 refers expressly to consent given
before a notice of denunciation is received, the provision does not proscribe
the possibility of accepting the offer after the denunciation.4 9 It simply does
not regulate that situation. Again, there is no reason to interpret Article 72
of the ICSID Convention a contrario. Likewise, Article 71 does in fact
regulate the period of time following the denunciation and expressly
establishes that the Convention shall remain in force for six months after
45.

See ICSID Convention, supranote 1, art. 72.

46.

See id.

47.

See Tietie, supra note 10, at 19.

48.

See generally ICSID Convention, supranote 1.

49.

Id. art. 72.
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the denunciation.so By the same token, because Article 71 also provides
that the denunciation takes effect six months after receipt of the notice, it is
safe to assume that in absence of specific circumstances, once the sixmonth survival period has expired, it is no longer possible to accept any
offer of arbitration.
Therefore, it is this article's submission that Articles 71 and 72 are
aimed at regulating two different realities. Whilst Article 71 determines the
exact date upon which the denunciation of the ICSID Convention becomes
effective, i.e., as of six months after receipt of the notice of denunciation by
the World Bank, Article 72 constitutes an expression of the final part of
Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention according to which-once the
parties have given their consent-no party may withdraw its consent
unilaterally. 5' The latter provision is just a manifestation of the rule of
international law whereby an arbitration agreement is autonomous in
relation to the other provisions of a treaty. In the absence of Article 72, a
host State or an investor's State of origin could have nullified a consent
agreement at any time convenient to it by withdrawing from the
Convention. 52 Article 72 is also deemed an exception to the nationality
requirement established in Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention.53 in
other words, Article 72 is not aimed at mere offers of arbitration, but at
agreements per se. Article 72 is the additional legal safeguard to
contractual arbitration clauses.54
Put in another way, all Article 72 determines is that if
Denunciationland were to denounce the ICSID Convention, those ICSID
arbitration clauses to which Denunciationland is a party, or those
agreements in which one of the parties is a Denunciationland national
investor-which have been perfected before Denunciationland sent the
notice of denunciation to the World Bank-would not be affected by the
fact that after the conclusion of such agreement to arbitrate,
Denunciationland issued its notice of denunciation.
When one is interpreting Article 72 of the ICSID Convention, the
preparatory works are helpful. During the meeting of the Committee of the
Whole on Settlement of Investment Disputes of February 25, 1965, Mr.
Aron Broches indicated that the intention of that provision-which in the
50.

Id. art. 71.

51.

Id. art. 25(1).

52.

SCHREUER, supra note 11, at 1280.

53.

Tietje, supra note 10, at 7.

54.
According to Tietje, Nowrot, and Wackernagel, the purpose of the current Article 72 of
the ICSID Convention is to strengthen the contractual arbitration clauses in order for them not to be
affected in the event of a denunciation of the ICSID Convention. See id. at 17.
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draft Convention at the time was Article 73-was to make it clear that if a
State had consented to arbitration, for instance by entering into an
arbitration clause with an investor, the subsequent denunciation of the
ICSID Convention by that State would not relieve it from its obligation to
go to arbitration if a dispute arose. 5 This indication serves as guidance
when trying to understand the reach of Article 72. In addition, it could be
argued that Article 71, by establishing the six-moth period, covers precisely
the case of offers of consent to arbitration. Moreover, the ICSID
Convention does not contemplate a prohibition on accepting offers of
arbitration during the six-moth period of Article 71. Thus, such offers can
be accepted within the six month period.
VI. A USEFUL EXERCISE OF INTERPRETATION
The following exercise may be useful to understand and explain the
interaction between Articles 71 and 72 of the ICSID Convention: first, let
us separate the two parts of Article 71. Doing so reverts to the original
version of the two provisions embedded in the current Article 71, which
throughout many preparatory documents of the ICSID Convention, was
kept as two separate provisions. The result would be as follows:
1)
2)

Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention by
written notice to the depositary of this Convention; and57
The denunciation shall take effect six months after receipt
of such notice.

Secondly, let us put the current Article 72 between the two parts (or
provisions) in Article 71. The result would read as follows:
1)
2)

55.

Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention by
written notice to the depositary of this Convention.59
Notice by a Contracting State pursuant to [the foregoing
provision] shall not affect the rights or obligations under
this Convention of that State or of any of its constituent
subdivisions or agencies or of any national of that State

ICSID, supranote 34, at 1009.

56.
Id. at 301; ICSID Convention, supra note 1 (Reference, more precisely, is made to the
First Draft of the ICSID Convention prepared by the World Bank (Doc. 43) on September 11, 1964, as
well as to the Revised Draft of the ICSID Convention on December 11, 1964, prepared by the Legal
Committee on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (Doc. 123)).
57.

ICSID Convention, supranote 1, art. 71.

58.

Id.

59.

Id.
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arising out of consent to the jurisdiction of the Centre given
by one of them before such notice was received by the
depositary; and60
The denunciation shall take effect six months after receipt
of such notice.61

This sequence seems quite logical.
First, the denunciation is
contemplated.
Second, everything related to arbitration clauses or
agreements in force at the time of the denunciation is dealt with. Finally, a
survival clause is provided, which is typical of investment promotion and
protection instruments in which ICSID offers can be accepted. Hence,
Article 72 serves to complement the first part of Article 71, but only
partially.62 In other words, Article 72 does not regulate the case of the
investors that may accept an offer of ICSID arbitration during the sixmonth period referred to in the second part of Article 71, and it is precisely
that second part of Article 71 of the ICSID Convention that regulates that
case or situation.
Julien Fouret argues that it would seem contrary to the principle of
good faith in international law for a party, knowing that a State has
denounced the ICSID Convention, to perfect its consent during the sixmonth period of Article 71.63 It is this article's submission that the correct
conclusion should be exactly the opposite. That is, what appears contrary
to the principle of good faith is that Denunciationland denounces the ICSID
Convention from one day to the next, negatively affecting foreign investors
who invested in Denunciationland when the rules in force at the time of
their investment provided for access to ICSID arbitration. Should that be
the case, investors would be suddenly deprived of a dispute settlement
mechanism that was available for them at the time of their investment. A
good faith interpretation cannot lead to that result. Thus, the six-month
period in Article 71 must be available for those investors who wish to
accept an offer of ICSID arbitration before such period expires.
VII. OTHER VIEWS

For the sake of brevity, and perhaps running the risk of
oversimplifying, it can be said that the core of the different views regarding
the effectiveness of the denunciation lies in the diverging conception of the
nature of provisions contemplating ICSID arbitration in BITs. Those views
60.

Id. art. 72.

61.

Id. art.71.

62.

For a contrary position, see Fouret,supranote 11, at 73-74.

63.

Id. at 84.
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differ between, on the one hand, those who consider that with the notice of
denunciation of the ICSID arbitration clause ceases to be an option and, and
on the other hand, those who consider that the ICSID arbitration provision
would still be available even after the six-month period in Article 71 has
elapsed, as long as the language of the respective BIT allows such a
possibility.
Under the first approach-or Schreuer's original or 2001 positionStates' expressions of consent to ICSID arbitration in BITs constitute
"offers of consent." Conversely, the alternative approach considers States'
expressions of consent to ICSID arbitration in BITs as "consent" under
Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, i.e., a consent that becomes
irrevocable once given. This is what Mr. Oscar Garibaldi calls a choice of
paradigms between accepting the "contract analogy" theory as opposed to
the view that a State is internationally bound by its unilateral expression of
consent.6 Under the latter approach, the phrase given by one of them in
Article 72 would refer to an expression of consent by the host State that
remains unaffected by a notice under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention.65
In the author's view, the possibility of accepting offers of arbitration
after the expiry of the six-month period of Article 71 seems a bit too
audacious. Nevertheless, the arguments that support the position of
Garibaldi, Gaillard, Mantilla-Serrano, and others are quite convincing.
Indeed, this article is not aimed at addressing or refuting such position.
Suffice it to say that a diligent practitioner must bear in mind that, in spite
of those solid arguments, the Secretary-General of ICSID could refuse to
register the request for arbitration if, in his or her view, the dispute is
That is a practical reason that
clearly outside the ICSID's jurisdiction.
militates against allocating all hopes to the latter approach.
VIII. CONCLUSION

There appears to be a contradiction between Articles 71 and 72 of the
ICSID Convention. Pursuant to the former, if a State denounces the ICSID
Convention, it will continue to be a Contracting State during the following
six-month period. Thus, it seems as if an investor should be able to accept
an offer of consent to the ICSID within that period. Nonetheless, when
reading Article 72 textually, it appears like any acceptance of an offer of
consent to the ICSID Convention would have to occur before the depository

64.
Id. at 255-56 (But Garibaldi considers that treating this matter as a mere choice of
paradigm is an untenable position.).
65.

See Id.

66.

See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 36(3).
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receives the notice of denunciation. Yet, there is no contradiction between
the two norms. Articles 71 and 72 simply regulate two different situations.
The key to understanding the interaction between the two provisions is
to keep in mind that Article 72 does not prohibit ICSID arbitration
agreements from being perfected during the six-month survival period.
Although Article 72 refers to consent given before a notice of denunciation
is received, the provision does not proscribe consent subsequent to
reception of the notice of denunciation by the depository. Nowhere in the
ICSID Convention is such a prohibition stated. Furthermore, there is no
reason to interpret Article 72 of the ICSID Convention a contrario. Thus, it
is possible to accept offers of consent to ICSID arbitration during the sixmonth survival period. The text of Article 71 reinforces this conclusion by
establishing that the ICSID Convention shall remain in force for six months
after denunciation.

